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Classic findings from the neuropsychological literature invariably indicated that
performances on tests of memory that can be accomplished without conscious
awareness were largely spared in amnesia, while those that required conscious retrieval
(e.g., via recognition or recall) of information learned in the very same sessions was
devastatingly impaired. Based on reports of such dissociations, it was proposed that one
of the fundamental distinctions between memory systems is whether or not they support
conscious access to remembered content. Only recently have we come to realize that the
putative systemic division of labor between conscious and unconscious memory is not so
clean. A primary goal of this review is to examine recent evidence that has been advanced
against the view that the hippocampus is selectively critical for conscious memory.
Along the way, consideration is given to criticisms that have been levied against these
findings, potential explanations for differences in the reported results are proposed, and
methodological pitfalls in investigations of unconsciousmemory are discussed. Ultimately,
it is concluded that a tipping point has been reached, and that while conscious recollection
depends critically on hippocampal integrity, the reach of the hippocampus extends to
unconscious aspects of memory performance when relational memory processing and
representation are required.
Keywords: hippocampus, amnesia, implicit memory, unconscious memory, relational memory, priming, fMRI,
neuroimaging
Memory is a ubiquitous part of our daily experience. It is not
just the occasional act of remembering an event or an appoint-
ment, or being able to recognize an individual as someone seen
in the past, the benefits of previous experience facilitate all
aspects of thinking, taking action, and perceiving. Therefore, it
is not surprising that the organization of memory, the manner in
which it is expressed or used, and its representation in the brain
have been of substantial interest to philosophers, scientists, and
laypeople alike. The idea that memory can take multiple forms
was advocated in the early 1800s by the philosopher Maine de
Biran, who proposed that representative, mechanical, and sensitive
memory were differentially associated with conscious awareness,
rigid/inflexible behavior, and emotional lability (Maine de Biran,
1804/1929; see also Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001). Empirical
investigations conducted by modern-day cognitive psychologists
and cognitive neuroscientists have extended these views, identify-
ing different classes of memory and characterizing their perma-
nence over time, how they might be expressed in thought and
action, and whether or not they depend on conscious apprehen-
sion of encoded and/or retrieved content. Indeed, it seems that
early philosophical ideas were not far from the mark, as much
of the driving force behind contemporary research involves iden-
tification and differentiation of memory systems and the neural
substrates that support them.
Initial evidence for the memory systems view came from now-
classic reports (e.g., Milner, 1962) of spared and impaired mem-
ory performances following damage to structures located in the
medial aspect of the temporal lobes (MTL; i.e., the hippocampus
and adjacent cortical structures in the parahippocampal region).
These studies, reviewed briefly below, invariably indicated that
performances on tests of memory that proceed relatively auto-
matically (i.e., in the absence of effortful retrieval attempts) and
without conscious awareness were largely spared, while those that
required amnesic patients to consciously recover (e.g., via recog-
nition or recall) information learned in the very same sessions was
devastatingly impaired. Based on reports of such dissociations, it
was proposed that one of the fundamental distinctions between
memory systems is whether or not they support conscious access
to remembered content. This view that memory systems divide
on consciousness has now become so ensconced in the field as
to be considered essentially a first principle from which new find-
ings can be anchored. Indeed, it has been proposed that one could
infer whether or not performance on a particular task was sup-
ported by explicit memory processes based on the presence or
absence ofMTL activity in neuroimaging data (cf. Henson, 2003).
Only recently have we come to realize that the putative sys-
temic division of labor between conscious and unconscious mem-
ory is not so clean. Therefore, a primary goal of this review is to
examine recent evidence that has been advanced against the view
that the hippocampus is selectively critical for conscious mem-
ory. As part of this objective, we review evidence for hippocampal
involvement in successful memory expression (e.g., in eye move-
ment behavior) when explicit responses are incorrect, hippocam-
pal contributions to learning when participants are unaware of
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the contingencies that support increasingly proficient responding,
and hippocampal recruitment during encoding when materials
are presented subliminally (i.e., masked from conscious aware-
ness). Along the way, consideration is given to criticisms that have
been levied against these findings (provided that they exist), and
potential explanations for differences in the reported results are
proposed. In addition, some of the methodological and interpre-
tive pitfalls that can undermine claims for or against hippocampal
contributions to memory without awareness are considered; these
are described in the context of the associative priming literature,
which has a relatively long history in the investigation of questions
about memory, awareness, and the MTL. It is important to note
that findings are reported from several neuropsychological inves-
tigations and that many of these were conducted with patients of
mixed etiology (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease, Korsakoff ’s syndrome)
who were selected based on their documented memory impair-
ment. When findings can be more confidently attributed to the
hippocampus (e.g., because recruitment was limited to patients
with relatively circumscribed hippocampal lesions) we say so in
the text. Ultimately, it is concluded that we have indeed reached
a tipping point, and that the role of the hippocampus in mem-
ory has more to do with the processing and representational
demands of the task at hand than with conscious awareness. The
implications of this conclusion for some theoretical perspectives
of hippocampal function are briefly considered, and some sug-
gestions are made as to how best to proceed in future work.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: DISSOCIATION OF CONSCIOUS
AND UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY EXPRESSION FOLLOWING
AMNESIA
The nature of the memory impairment following amnesia, and
by extension, the role of the hippocampus and adjacent MTL
cortical structures in learning and memory has been a source of
considerable interest and intense theoretical debate. As described
briefly above, one question that has been subject to much dis-
agreement in the literature concerns the proposed selective role of
the hippocampus in conscious (i.e., aware or explicit) expressions
of memory (cf., Postma et al., 2008; Reder et al., 2009; Henke,
2010). While it is generally agreed that conscious recollection,
which involves calling to mind the components of past events
and experiences, depends critically on hippocampal integrity, the
role of this structure in unconscious (i.e., unaware or implicit)
expressions of memory has generally been regarded as far more
speculative. Such speculation is well-founded, as several early
neuropsychological findings documented dissociations between
certain forms of learning, which were intact in amnesia, and the
ability to consciously recognize or report information encoun-
tered in the context of the associated learning experience. As we
shall see, this work inspired theoretical frameworks of hippocam-
pal function that hinged on conscious access to remembered
content (e.g., Moscovitch, 1992; Squire, 2004; see also Graf and
Schacter, 1985), though not all theoretical perspectives share this
view (e.g., Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Henke, 2010).
The critical role played by the hippocampus in conscious
retrieval of new memories was evident in the seminal description
of the famous amnesic patient H.M., which contains anecdo-
tal descriptions of behavior based on informal interactions and
reports of impaired performances on standardized neuropsycho-
logical tests ofmemory (Scoville andMilner, 1957; see alsoMilner
et al., 1968). In each case, the ability of this individual to lay down
lasting long-term memory representations amenable to explicit
report was severely impaired. For example, when queried a half-
hour after taking lunch, it was indicated that H.M. could not recall
having gone to lunch, let alone exactly what had been enjoyed or
the company he had been in. And in formal testing it was noted
that “once he had turned to a new task the nature of the pre-
ceding one could no longer be recalled, nor the test recognized
if repeated” (Scoville and Milner, 1957; p. 108).
Not long after these initial impairments were documented,
what has since been described as an astonishing demonstration
of intact learning and long-term retention of novel information
was reported by Brenda Milner (Milner, 1962; see also Milner
et al., 1998). In this work, H.M. learned, over the course of sev-
eral trials, to trace within the lines of an object using only the
image reflected from a mirror (i.e., the mirror tracing task; see
Figure 1A). In keeping with prior observations, this example of
preserved motor skill learning was accompanied by an inability to
accurately describe the circumstances in which the new skill was
acquired and severely impaired recognition of the apparatus that
had been used during testing. Such results have since been repli-
cated with the additional striking report that H.M.’s retention of
the acquired skill was still evident as many as 359 days after initial
exposure to the task (Gabrieli et al., 1993). Importantly, it was also
demonstrated that this finding was not limited to mirror tracing
as follow-up investigations indicated that H.M. could successfully
acquire, and subsequently retain, new motor skills in the context
of several other experimental tasks (e.g., rotary pursuit, bimanual
tracking, tapping; cf. Corkin, 1968).
The above results provided initial empirical evidence for the
multiple memory systems perspective and they also inspired
investigators to question whether or not intact long-term learn-
ing went beyond the domain of motor skills. That this was indeed
the case, was initially reported by Warrington and Weiskrantz
(1968; see also, Milner et al., 1968) who showed that amnesic
patients, like matched controls, could more readily identify pic-
tures of fragmented words and objects (i.e., identify them in an
increasingly degraded form) with repeated exposure to the stim-
ulus set (see Figure 1B). Facilitated identification of degraded
pictures was retained from day to day during testing, and savings
was documented for one patient even after a 3 month retention
interval. This type of learning is an example of repetition prim-
ing, which refers to a benefit in performance that accrues with
repeated exposure to particular items when memory is tested
indirectly—that is, without reference to a memory test or to the
fact that some of the items had been seen previously (cf. Schacter,
1987; Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1988). Such effects have
also been documented when participants are instructed to com-
plete three letter stems (e.g., POS_____) with “the first word
that comes to mind.” Unbeknownst to the participant, a subset
of these stems correspond to words encountered during an ear-
lier study phase (e.g., POSTURE), and priming is evident to the
extent that participants complete the stems with studied words
more often than would be expected by chance (i.e., without the
associated study exposure). With these instructions, which simply
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FIGURE 1 | Classic evidence for intact unconscious memory following
amnesia. (A) Left: Illustration of the mirror tracing apparatus. The paper and
the participant’s hand are blocked from view, and tracing (within the lines of
the star) is accomplished via the reflection of the image in the mirror. Right:
Performance of patient H.M. on the mirror tracing task as reported by Milner
(1962; see also Milner et al., 1998). The number of tracing errors (i.e., tracing
outside of the boundaries) declined across trials and sessions illustrating
learning and retention of this motor skill. (B) Left: Illustration of the materials
used to examine memory for primed items. Participants are presented with
increasingly complete pictures of objects across trials and are asked to name
the object, even in its degraded form. Right: Performance of amnesic
patients and controls on the picture naming task as reported by Warrington
and Weiskrantz (1968). Both groups made fewer errors (i.e., provided fewer
incorrect names, even for degraded images) when the picture set was
presented repeatedly across several trials and sessions illustrating a
reprocessing or priming effect. (C) Left: Illustration of word triplets used in
the mirror-reading task. Some of these triplets were seen just once,
others were repeated several times during testing. Participants were
to read each triplet as quickly as possible when it was presented. Right:
Performance of amnesics and controls on the mirror reading task
reported by Cohen and Squire (1980). Mean reading times of patients and
controls decreased consistently across several days of testing providing
evidence for intact perceptual skill learning in amnesia. Patients did not
benefit as much as controls from repeated presentations of the same
triplets. [Figure 1A, right, reprinted with permission from Elsevier; Figure 1B,
right, reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd;
http://www.nature.com/; Figure 1C, right, reprinted with permission from
AAAS; http://www.aaas.org/].
orient participants to the stem-completion requirement, the task
is “treated more as a ‘guessing game’ than a formal test of mem-
ory” (Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1968; p. 974), and amnesic
patients perform much like controls. In contrast, when instruc-
tions reference prior experience, as in cued recall or recognition,
learning effects observed in amnesia are much reduced (e.g.,
Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1968; Squire et al., 1978).
Following on the heels of these reports, intact performances on
cognitive (e.g., Tower of Hanoi; see Cohen, 1984) and perceptual
skill learning tasks were also observed (Cohen and Squire, 1980).
In one of these experiments (Cohen and Squire, 1980), amnesic
patients acquired a pattern analyzing skill (i.e. reading mirror
reversed text) as quickly as a control group, but failed to show
the normal amount of additional facilitation to a subset of word
triplets that were presented 20 times over the course of the exper-
iment (see Figure 1C). The small amount of repetition-based
facilitation that was evident in the performances of amnesic
patients was subsequently considered akin to effects of perceptual
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priming, and controls were said to have shown greater benefit of
repetition because unlike patients, they had explicit knowledge
of the repeated items and could likely retrieve the remaining two
words after having read the first (Cohen, 1984). Indeed, when par-
ticipants were asked about the occurrence of repetitions, patients
indicated that there were none, whereas controls reported them
spontaneously. A more objective assessment revealed that explicit
recognition was severely impaired among amnesic patients, even
for the subset of words seen 20 times previously. Such results pro-
vide strong evidence for dissociation of skilled performance on
the one hand and conscious recollection of the events surround-
ing learning on the other.
MODELS OF HIPPOCAMPAL FUNCTION: A RANGE
OF PERSPECTIVES ON CONSCIOUSNESS
It was based on reports like those described briefly above that the
initial distinction between declarative (“knowing that”) and pro-
cedural (“knowing how”) memory systems was drawn (Cohen
and Squire, 1980). According to this perspective, the hippocam-
pal system (i.e., the hippocampus along with the entorhinal,
perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortices) is critically involved
in the representation of a particular type of memory, declarative
memory, which is selectively compromised in amnesia. Because
memory for the procedures or operations that support nor-
mal acquisition of skilled performance was largely preserved, it
was proposed that a different brain system must support pro-
cedural memory. Borrowing from the nomenclature of Bruner
(1969), knowledge garnered by the procedural memory system
was said to bewithout record (inaccessible to verbal reports; absent
any explicit knowledge of events surrounding learning), and to
reflect the tuning and modification of dedicated cortical and
subcortical processors that are engaged during the performance
of a particular task. Declarative memory was said to be with
record (consciously accessible; amenable to verbal report) and to
reflect the combined outcomes of having engaged said processors
(Cohen, 1984; Squire and Cohen, 1984). The resulting declarative
memory database “provided the basis for access to facts acquired
during the course of experience and for conscious recollection of
the learning experiences themselves” (Cohen, 1984; p. 97). Most
important for the purpose of this review, contemporary versions
of this theory continue to share in common with a handful of
other models (e.g., Moscovitch, 1992) the proposed dichotomy
between aware and unaware expressions of memory, and their
dependence or not on structures in the hippocampal system (cf.
Squire, 2004; Squire et al., 2004).
The proposed link between conscious awareness and hip-
pocampal system function has perhaps been articulated most
strongly in the component process model developed by
Moscovitch and colleagues (e.g., Moscovitch and Umilta, 1991;
Moscovitch, 1992). According to the model only information
that has been consciously apprehended is encoded by the hip-
pocampal system, which then integrates the elements of that
event, and the conscious experience of it, into a memory trace.
An index of this memory trace is laid down in the hippocam-
pus and can subsequently be used to recover the components
of previously experienced events when associatively bound cues
are available. The components themselves (e.g., faces, objects,
words) are represented in domain-specific posterior neocorti-
cal (and other) modules that process and store perceptual and
conceptual records of stimulus input. As an aside, processing
mediated by these domain-specific modules is said to be sufficient
for item-specific (e.g., repetition priming) or skill-based (e.g.,
mirror tracing) implicit memory expression, a view that is gen-
erally consistent with what has been proposed in the context
of other models described here (e.g., Cohen and Eichenbaum,
1993; Squire, 2004; Henke, 2010). Returning to the hippocampal
system, explicit recovery of memories for past events and experi-
ences (i.e., episodic memory) depends on an effective cue, which
triggers the hippocampal index and elicits automatic and oblig-
atory recovery of associated elements as well as the conscious
experience of the original event. The retrieval process is said
to be automatic because events are often remembered without
intention—they “pop into mind much as preattentive percep-
tual stimuli pop out of their background” (Moscovitch, 1992; p.
260) 1. Important for our purposes, a distinguishing feature of
this model as it was originally articulated is that consciousness
is built into newly established hippocampus-dependent memory
representations, and is automatically recovered during retrieval.
Notably, a recent extension of the component process
model seems to exercise a bit more flexibility with respect to
consciousness of hippocampus-supported memory expression
(Moscovitch, 2008; see also Sheldon and Moscovitch, 2010).
Specifically, it is now suggested that conscious recollection
involves (at least) two separate, but interacting stages of process-
ing. During stage one, studied content is retrieved automatically
and obligatorilywithout concomitant awareness in a process medi-
ated by the hippocampal system. Successful associative retrieval
at this stage of processing may be revealed when indirect testing
methods are used (e.g., speeded lexical decision, eye tracking).
During the second, slower stage of processing, retrieved con-
tent becomes consciously accessible and can influence explicit
responses (e.g., on recall or recognition tests) in a process said
to be mediated by interaction of the hippocampal system with
prefrontal and perhaps parietal lobe structures. Based on this
proposal, one might infer that when the second stage of process-
ing is disrupted or deficient indirect testing measures will reveal
evidence of hippocampus-dependent memory in the absence of
associated awareness (cf. Hannula and Ranganath, 2009).
While there is an undeniable link between the MTL mem-
ory system and conscious memory expression, there is sharply
declining acceptance of the hypothesis that conscious memory
is the linchpin function of the hippocampus. For example, in
a direct extension of the declarative memory theory, Cohen
and Eichenbaum (1993; see also Eichenbaum et al., 1994) pro-
posed that structures in the parahippocampal region (i.e., the
perirhinal, parahippocampal, and entorhinal cortices) support
1While hippocampus-dependent encoding/retrieval processes are character-
ized as automatic in the model, this does not preclude the possibility that
such processes can be influenced by instruction, task demands, or strat-
egy. Indeed, recent work indicates that memory is improved by encoding
strategies that depend critically on hippocampal integrity (e.g., Voss et al.,
2011). Additional detail about the characterization of hippocampal function
as automatic and/or obligatory can be found in Moscovitch (1992).
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memory for individual items and that the hippocampus itself
is critically involved in binding together arbitrary (i.e., non-
derivable) relationships among items encountered in the context
of some scene or event. A key property of the resulting relational
memory representations is compositionality—individual items
retain their representation in memory independent of, and in
addition to, the larger relational structure in which they are
bound. Compositionality permits flexible memory expression
which means that relational memory retrieval is not rigidly tied
to the particulars of the original learning experience or the
environment associated with memory acquisition; hippocampus-
dependent relational memories can be expressed in variety of
contexts and in response to any number of relationally bound
cues. In contrast, rigidly bound (or fused) associations, those that
lack flexibility and compositionality, are said to be the province
of structures in the parahippocampal region (e.g., Eichenbaum
and Bunsey, 1995; Pascalis et al., 2009). On this view, “the hip-
pocampal system plays only an indirect role in consciousness—it
organizes the database, so to speak, on which other brain systems
may operate and, in so doing, determines the structure and range
of conscious recollections” (Cohen et al., 1997; p. 148; see also
Ryan andCohen, 2003;Moses andRyan, 2006). Themodified ver-
sion of the component process model (Moscovitch, 2008), which
postulates a two-stage retrieval process, appears to share at least
certain aspects of this view—namely, that processing mediated by
the hippocampal system during retrieval provides the raw mate-
rials (i.e., reinstates previously bound elements) that may then
be communicated with other brain regions to support conscious
memory performance. Importantly though, neither the compo-
nent process model nor the declarative memory theory (cf. Squire
et al., 2004) distinguish between types of representation mediated
by the hippocampus and adjacent MTL cortical structures as is
done in the relational memory theory.
One final model to be considered here, which diverges most
noticeably from views of hippocampal function in which con-
scious awareness plays a prominent role, was proposed recently
by Henke (2010). According to the model, memory systems are
best distinguished not on the basis of conscious apprehension,
but rather by the type of processing they support. In this case,
conscious awareness of encoded and retrieved content does not
influence which processing mode is engaged, and therefore does
not figure into the model. Instead, processing modes and the
memory systems on which they depend are differentiated based
on the speed of memory acquisition (i.e., rapid, single trial learn-
ing vs. slow, incremental learning), the number of elements to
be encoded (i.e., single items vs. associations), and the flexibility
of the resulting memory representations. Rapidly encoded novel
associations that lend themselves to flexible memory expression
are said to depend upon interactions between the hippocampus
and specialized neocortical processing sites. When encoding is
temporally extended (i.e., involves more than one study exposure)
the hippocampus might augment performance early in learning,
but would not be required for successful memory acquisition.
Instead, temporally extended learning is said to depend critically
on interaction of neocortical structures with the basal ganglia, the
cerebellum, or the parahippocampal gyrus depending upon task
demands. The end result of having engaged in repeated processing
of the same information is an inflexible, rigidly bound associative
memory representation. A final processing mode, which involves
rapid encoding of single (or unitized) items, is said to depend crit-
ically on the parahippocampal gyrus. While this model clearly
shares several features in common with the relational memory
theory, no strong claims have been made in the context of the
relational memory theory as to whether or not hippocampus-
mediated encoding can proceed subliminally. More generally,
the proposal that the hippocampus is absolutely unnecessary for
learning when repeated study exposures are provided represents
a departure from the relational memory theory, which empha-
sizes representational characteristics of hippocampus-dependent
memory above all else.
As can be seen, the models of hippocampal (and hippocam-
pal system) function described here, which represent a subset
of those proposed in the literature, provide a range of perspec-
tives on the relationship between the hippocampus and conscious
apprehension of retrieved and/or encoded content (for a sum-
mary see Table 1). In the paragraphs that follow, evidence for
and against the proposed role of the hippocampus in mem-
ory without awareness is evaluated. For ease of comparison to
the models described above, these studies are considered sepa-
rately as a function of whether they were designed to investigate
hippocampal involvement in implicit memory retrieval, implicit
learning that develops over the course of several experimental
trials, or implicit (and in the examples provided, subliminal)
encoding. First, however, findings from the associative priming
literature are used to illustrate some of the investigative pitfalls
that can complicate interpretation of results reported in studies
of unconscious learning and memory. As part of this objective,
we highlight two important issues: (1) the potential for explicit
memory contamination on indirect tests of memory, and (2) the
need to characterize the nature of the underlying memory rep-
resentations that support performance on these tests. Following
discussion of these issues, we shall see that the associative prim-
ing literature provides some initial evidence in favor of the view
that the hippocampus does indeed play a critical role in uncon-
scious memory expression even when strict criteria are in place to
minimize explicit contributions to performance.
ASSOCIATIVE PRIMING: IDENTIFYING INVESTIGATIVE
PITFALLS IN STUDIES OF “UNCONSCIOUS” MEMORY
The initial collection of investigations designed to identify spared
and impaired memory performances in amnesia, described
briefly in the opening section, provides strong support for theo-
retical positions that postulate a divide in memory systems based
on whether or not conscious awareness accompanies demonstra-
tions of successful retrieval. The priming literature, for example,
demonstrated normal or near normal retrieval of studied content,
but only when indirect testing methods were used (cf. Schacter,
1987). A limitation of these studies was the selective assessment
of memory for individual items. Whether or not the same pat-
tern of performance would be observed for tests of memory that
required participants to form new associations among items that
did not have pre-existing relationships had yet to be examined.
In the event that they could be documented, demonstrations of
intact priming for novel associations in amnesia would further
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Table 1 | Summary of hippocampal models and associated perspectives on requirements for consciousness of encoding and retrieval.
Model Representative citation MTL brain Type of memory Consciousness Consciousness
regions of Encoding of Retrieval
Declarative memory
theory
Squire et al. (2004) Hippocampus and MTL
cortical structures
Conscious memory for facts
and events
Yes Yes
Component process
model
Moscovitch (1992) Hippocampus and MTL
cortical structures
Components of consciously
apprehended events
Yes Yes
Two-stage model of Moscovitch (2008) Hippocampus (PFC and Consciously recollected N/A Stage 1—No
recollection parietal cortex) events Stage 2—Yes
Relational memory
theory
Eichenbaum et al. (1994) Hippocampus Flexible, compositional
inter-item and item-context
relationships
– Not required
MTL cortical structures Single items and inflexible
(fused/unitized) associations
– Not required
Processing model Henke (2010) Hippocampus Rapidly encoded, flexible
associations
Not required Not required
Parahipp. Gyrus (BG and
cerebellum)
Incrementally learned, inflexible
associations
Not required Not required
Parahipp. gyrus Single items and inflexible
(fused/unitized) associations
Not required Not required
MTL cortical structures include the perirhinal, parahippocampal, and entorhinal cortex; BG, basal ganglia; PFC, prefrontal cortex; –, not explicitly described in the
model. Note that the 2-stage model of recollection is an extension (and subset) of the component process model.
substantiate claims that the hippocampus was not required for,
and does not support, unaware expressions of memory.
In the mid-1980s, two independent research groups pro-
vided initial reports of intact associative priming in memory
impaired individuals (Graf and Schacter, 1985; Moscovitch et al.,
1986). In both studies, implicit memory for unrelated word
pairs was spared despite gross impairment of explicit memory
for the same materials. This outcome seemed not to depend
upon the exact testing methods that had been used, as differ-
ent paradigmatic approaches were adopted by the two groups.
In one case (Graf and Schacter, 1985), the dependent mea-
sure was successful cued stem-completion. Following a study
phase in which participants generated sentences that incorpo-
rated both words from unrelated cue-target pairs (e.g., KINDLY-
STICK → the kindly woman picked up the stick) an indirect
stem-completion test was administered. Results showed that both
patients and controls were more likely to complete stems with
studied targets when cue-target pairs were intact (e.g., KINDLY-
STI___) than when they were not (e.g., IRRATIONAL-STI___).
In the remaining case (Moscovitch et al., 1986), the dependent
measure was reading speed. During a learning phase partic-
ipants read several unrelated word pairs (e.g., MERCHANT-
TRIBUTE, DAMPNESS-SILENCE, JOURNEY-TREMBLE) and
were instructed to study them. Shortly thereafter, with speeded
reading instructions, patients and controls read lists of intact
pairs (e.g., MERCHANT-TRIBUTE) more quickly than lists
of re-arranged pairs (e.g., DAMPNESS-TREMBLE). Because
the individual words had been studied in both experimen-
tal conditions, the resulting facilitation was attributed to
implicit memory for previously presented associations. Based
on these outcomes, it was concluded that the hippocampus
and related limbic structures were not critical for the initial
acquisition and subsequent retention of novel associations;
rather, their role was to “make newly acquired information
available to consciousness” (Moscovitch et al., 1986; p. 345).
At face value these results seem difficult to reconcile with the
relational memory theory (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993) and
related models (Henke, 2010), which propose a critical role for
the hippocampus in relational memory processing and repre-
sentation with or without awareness. But, as described in the
sections that follow, the results reported in these early experi-
ments were not always successfully replicated. In the wake of these
failed replications, researchers became increasingly convinced
that explicit memory processes were contributing to cued stem-
completion performance (e.g., Shimamura and Squire, 1989;
Bowers and Schacter, 1990; Reingold and Goshen-Gottstein,
1996; McKone and Slee, 1997; Gooding et al., 1999), and that
speeded reading was often mediated by inflexible perceptual or
production-based memory representations (e.g., Poldrack and
Cohen, 1997). According to the relational memory theory (Cohen
and Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum et al., 1994; Eichenbaum
and Bunsey, 1995; Cohen et al., 1997) and the processing model
proposed by Henke (2010), this type of representation should
not depend critically on hippocampal integrity. Because issues of
awareness and representation require careful consideration in any
claim for or against a role for the hippocampus in unconscious
memory, relevant findings from the associative priming literature
are considered in the sections that follow.
CONFOUNDING EFFECTS OF EXPLICIT MEMORY CONTAMINATION
One of the greatest challenges posed by investigations of
implicit memory is the development of a paradigm that can
be used to index past experience absent any confounding
effects of conscious awareness. Without rigorous tests, explicit
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contributions to performance can go undetected and the use of
incidental instruction alone does not eliminate this confound
(e.g., Bowers and Schacter, 1990). Following the initial report
of intact cued stem-completion in amnesia (Graf and Schacter,
1985), reanalysis of the original data, combined with a new
follow-up investigation, revealed that only those patients char-
acterized as having “mild” memory deficits showed intact asso-
ciative priming (Schacter and Graf, 1986). Indeed, with just one
exception (Cermak et al., 1988a) work conducted with amnesic
patients by other labs indicated that any benefit of context rein-
statement in the cued stem-completion paradigm was negligible
(Cermak et al., 1988; Mayes and Gooding, 1989; Shimamura and
Squire, 1989). Insight into what might be driving this idiosyn-
cratic pattern of results was provided by experiments conducted
with neurologically intact college-age participants who completed
post-test awareness questionnaires. Based on their responses, it
was found that only those participants classified as “test-aware”
showed associative priming on the stem-completion test (Bowers
and Schacter, 1990;McKone and Slee, 1997; Gooding et al., 1999).
Even more problematic, a subset of participants confided that
they had deliberately completed the stems with a word that had
not been studied (McKone and Slee, 1997; Gooding et al., 1999).
Based on this evidence, there is general agreement that associa-
tive priming elicited by cued stem-completion is influenced by
explicit memory contamination (cf. Schacter et al., 2004), and
under these circumstances impaired performance among amnesic
patients is not surprising.
This line of work is instructive because it illustrates how
explicit retrieval processes can contaminate performance on indi-
rect tests of memory. However, it is important to note that the
reported outcomes do not completely preclude the possibility that
associative priming was mediated by unconscious processes on a
subset of the trials, or the possibility that performance on a given
trial might reflect both unconscious and conscious influences.
Consistent with the first possibility, Bowers and Schacter (1990)
suggested that test-awareness may have developed consequent to
several successful completions when intact cue-target pairs were
presented. This proposal was challenged by McKone and Slee
(1997) who had “aware” participants identify the pair from the
stem-completion task that they felt had triggered their awareness.
Based on these subjective reports it was determined that aware-
ness developed early in testing, and summary statistics limited to
trials preceding awareness provided no evidence for associative
priming. Importantly, caution was advised in the interpretation
of this result because it was based on so few trials. Of additional
concern, because the awareness questionnaire was administered
after completion of the indirect test, participants may have mises-
timated when awareness emerged ormay not have even had access
to this information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Under these
circumstances, they may have simply selected the first pair from
the list that they recognized now, after having been informed of
the link between study and test.
Even if we assume that associative priming in the cued stem-
completion paradigm was never strictly implicit, performance on
individual trials may have been influenced by both unconscious
and conscious memory processes (cf. Gooding et al., 1999). This
possibility is consistent with the recently proposed modifications
of the component process model described above, in which it
is indicated that conscious recollection is a two-stage process
(Moscovitch, 2008; Sheldon and Moscovitch, 2010). Specifically,
because cued stem-completion tests are not speeded, and there-
fore provide ample time for the second stage of processing
to proceed, awareness of successful completions may emerge
even if the initial retrieval process was not consciously medi-
ated. To the extent that both processes are implicated in cued
stem-completion performance, the relative absence of associative
priming in amnesia may indeed reflect genuine implicit associa-
tive memory impairment. This possibility cannot be dismissed
on the basis of post-test awareness questionnaires, and would
likely benefit from additional investigation with methods that can
more precisely estimate the time-course of memory processes that
emerge over the course of individual experimental trials (e.g.,
event-related potentials, magnetoencephalography).
CHARACTERIZING MEMORY REPRESENTATIONS THAT SUPPORT
PERFORMANCE
Consistent with findings that conscious memory processes are
relatively slow to develop (e.g., Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1994), alter-
native methods that emphasized rapid responding were also used
in associative priming investigations to more effectively mini-
mize explicit memory contamination. As indicated earlier, intact
associative priming in memory impaired individuals was initially
documented not only with stem-completion, but also in a study
that used speeded reading as the dependent measure (Moscovitch
et al., 1986). The first attempted replication of this result was
unsuccessful (Musen and Squire, 1993), but in this case, asso-
ciative priming was absent from the performances of patients
and controls alike, which raised concerns that there may have
been insufficient power to detect a statistically significant differ-
ence in reading time across lists of intact and recombined word
pairs (Light et al., 1996; Poldrack and Cohen, 1997). In line
with this possibility, affirmative evidence for associative prim-
ing in speeded reading was reported in a subsequent experiment
conducted with college-age participants (Poldrack and Cohen,
1997). Having replicated the result, the investigators went on to
examine the nature of the newly acquired memory representa-
tions. Results showed that reading-based response time facilita-
tion for intact pairs at test was much reduced when the first
and second word in a pair had swapped positions (e.g., study:
WINDOW-REASON; speeded reading: REASON-WINDOW)
and was completely absent when a word was interposed between
the paired items (e.g., study: WINDOW-REASON; speeded read-
ing WINDOW and REASON). Similar results were reported in a
speeded lexical decision task when paired words were presented
sequentially, rather than simultaneously, disrupting previously
established perceptual gestalt (Goshen-Gottstein andMoscovitch,
1995). Such findings imply that new learning was due to the
acquisition of an inflexible or rigidly bound memory representa-
tion that could only support associative priming when word pairs
were presented exactly as they had been seen or spoken during
encoding.
Under these circumstances performance may reflect the oper-
ation of the same specialized neocortical processors that have
been implicated in single item priming and procedural learning
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(Henson, 2003), or the operation of binding mechanisms in the
parahippocampal region that can support memory for unitized
word pairs (e.g., Quamme et al., 2007; Haskins et al., 2008;
see also Erikson and Desimone, 1999). Because specialized neo-
cortical processors are not typically compromised in amnesia,
and because there may be some sparing in the parahippocampal
region, amnesic patients might be expected to show normal levels
of associative priming when basic perceptual properties encoun-
tered during study are reinstated on the indirect test. Results
largely confirm these expectations (Gabrieli et al., 1997; Goshen-
Gottstein et al., 2000; Verfaellie et al., 2006). However, when this
constraint was not met—for example, when paired words were
presented sequentially rather than simultaneously—amnesic per-
formance has typically been impaired (Paller and Mayes, 1994;
Savage et al., 2002; Carlesimo et al., 2005); this is a finding to
which we will return.
Notably, at least one set of results is not easily accommo-
dated by the above dichotomy. Despite the use of methods that
retained the perceptual gestalt of intact pairs when memory
was tested indirectly, Yang et al. (2003) reported that associa-
tive priming was impaired, and indeed absent, among amnesic
patients who completed their experiment. This finding is even
more remarkable because participant recruitment was limited to
patients who had relatively selective MTL lesions, and several pro-
cedural details were in place to preclude explicit contamination.
Critically, a follow-up fMRI investigation conducted with neu-
rologically intact participants localized the associative priming
effect to the parahippocampal cortex (Yang et al., 2008). To the
extent that performance on this task was supported by a fused
representation of studied associations, such results would be pre-
dicted by the relational memory theory and byHenke’s processing
model; in contrast, the reported outcome presents a challenge for
the declarativememory theory, which proposes that memory pro-
cesses mediated by MTL structures are necessarily available for
conscious report (e.g., Squire, 2004).
So as not to leave any loose ends, and because one of these
investigations is especially relevant to questions about a poten-
tial role for the hippocampus in implicit memory, we now return
to findings of associative priming impairment with sequential
testing procedures noted briefly above (Paller and Mayes, 1994;
Savage et al., 2002; Carlesimo et al., 2005). As you may recall,
effects of associative priming were abolished when such proce-
dures were used with college-age participants, an effect that was
attributed to disruption of perceptual gestalt (Goshen-Gottstein
and Moscovitch, 1995). So why then was associative priming suc-
cessfully documented among controls recruited to participate in
the neuropsychological investigations? It seems likely that com-
bined use of multiple encoding exposures (i.e., between two and
six across experiments) and requirements to perform at least
two different elaborative encoding tasks during the study phase
may have been contributing factors. Such manipulations may
have minimized the acquisition of fused perceptual representa-
tions, supporting instead, the acquisition, and subsequent use
of higher-order relational memory representations. These repre-
sentations, which by some accounts (e.g., the relational memory
theory) are said to depend critically on hippocampal integrity,
may then have been better suited to support successful associative
priming among controls when sequential testing procedures
were used.
One of these investigations (Carlesimo et al., 2005) is particu-
larly notable because associative priming was absent only from the
performances of amnesic patients who had selective hippocampal
damage; those with amnesia consequent to thalamic or basal fore-
brain damage, in whom hippocampal volumes were within nor-
mal limits, had associative priming scores that were fully intact,
and even numerically larger than the same effect in control data.
That explicit contamination was unlikely to have influenced per-
formance is suggested by savvy methodological choices—intact
pairs were rarely encountered on the indirect test (i.e., the number
of trials was large, but few of these trials were intact pairs) and the
first item from each pair was presented very quickly (i.e., 300ms)
and immediately replaced by the second item, which remained in
view until participants indicated whether it was a word or a non-
word. This approach provides little incentive to engage in effortful
retrieval attempts and little time for strategic processing of the
first word from a given pair. Consequently, this result provides
strong evidence for hippocampus-mediated associative priming,
even in the absence of awareness.
CONVERGING EVIDENCE FOR HIPPOCAMPUS-SUPPORTED
UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY
The number of investigations that point to hippocampal involve-
ment in learning and memory without awareness has increased
substantially in recent years, making a strict division of labor
across memory systems based solely on subjective memory out-
come less tenable (cf., Reder et al., 2009; Henke, 2010; Dew
and Cabeza, 2011). While some of the reported findings have
been subject to debate, the evidence does indeed suggest that
we have reached a tipping point. In what follows, recent evi-
dence for (and in some cases against) hippocampal involvement
in unaware expressions of memory is presented. As indicated ear-
lier, these studies are considered separately based on whether they
were designed to investigate hippocampal involvement in implicit
memory retrieval, implicit learning, or implicit encoding. As will
be seen, some of the models described earlier can accommodate
the reported findings more easily than others.
EVIDENCE FOR HIPPOCAMPUS-SUPPORTED RETRIEVAL WITHOUT
AWARENESS
We have already seen at least one example from the associa-
tive priming literature that provides compelling support for the
proposal that hippocampal function extends beyond conscious
memory expression (i.e., Carlesimo et al., 2005). The evidence is
convincing not only because the task was carefully designed to
minimize explicit contributions to performance, but also because
impairments were evident only among amnesic patients with
selective hippocampal damage. These results are complemented
by converging reports of impaired associative priming from a
handful of other investigations that also used sequential test-
ing procedures (Paller and Mayes, 1994; Savage et al., 2002) and
by reports of impaired associative priming when information
from different modalities (e.g., voice-word associative priming)
must be bound to support performance (Schacter et al., 1995;
see also Curran and Schacter, 1997). However, because patients
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in the latter studies were of mixed etiology, impaired perfor-
mances cannot be attributed unambiguously to the hippocampus.
A converging methods approach could help disambiguate these
findings, but unfortunately most neuroimaging investigations
have focused on identification and characterization of the neu-
ral substrates of single item priming (Henson, 2003). Among
the associative priming studies utilizing neuroimaging meth-
ods (Mayes et al., 1998; Badgaiyan et al., 2003) concerns have
sometimes been raised that performance may have been sub-
ject to explicit memory contamination, which then precludes
conclusions about a role for the hippocampus in unconscious
memory.
Another approach used to examine hippocampus-dependent
implicit memory expression takes advantage of the fact that eye
movement behavior is influenced by prior exposure to visual
materials (see Hannula et al., 2010 for review). In several exper-
iments, it has been demonstrated that eye movements distin-
guish studied from novel items (e.g., Althoff and Cohen, 1999),
and that patterns of viewing can provide evidence of memory
for inter-item and item-context relationships (e.g., Ryan et al.,
2000; Hannula et al., 2007). These eye-movement-based mem-
ory effects are expressed rapidly and obligatorily in patterns of
viewing (e.g., Ryan et al., 2007), occur well in advance of explicit
recognition responses (e.g., Hannula et al., 2007, 2012), and have
even been documented in the absence of conscious access to
retrieved content (e.g., Ryan et al., 2000).
When combined with neuropsychological or neuroimaging
methods, eye movement investigations provide insight into hip-
pocampal function. For instance, it has been demonstrated that
like neurologically intact controls, amnesic patients with hip-
pocampal damage make fewer fixations and sample fewer dis-
tinct regions of previously studied as compared to novel items
(e.g., faces, buildings, scenes; Althoff and Cohen, 1999; Ryan
et al., 2000) and they do so despite poor recognition of the
same materials (Althoff et al., 1993; Althoff, 1998). This intact
eye-movement-based reprocessing, or repetition, effect resembles
findings of intact repetition priming described earlier. In con-
trast, amnesic patients fail to benefit from prior exposure when
relational memory is tested. In one of these investigations (Ryan
et al., 2000), participants were presented with pictures during a
test phase while their eye movements were recorded. Some of
these pictures were seen previously and remained unchanged,
others had also been seen previously, but were now systematically
manipulated such that relationships among scene elements had
changed (e.g., soap to the left of the sink was now to the right
of the sink). Under these circumstances, neurologically intact
individuals looked disproportionately at the part(s) of the scene
that had been manipulated, and did so even when they failed to
report the difference explicitly. The same eye-movement-based
relational memory effect was completely absent from the viewing
behavior of amnesic patients, including those with damage lim-
ited to the hippocampus (Ryan and Cohen, 2004). Such results
suggest that the hippocampus is critical for relational mem-
ory, irrespective of whether or not said memory is accessible
to awareness, and are predicted by the relational memory the-
ory (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993) and by Henke’s processing
model (2010).
Recently, it was reported that disproportionate viewing of
scene changes was only evident when participants were aware
that the change had been made (Smith et al., 2006). Based on
this null result, it was said that patients in the study conducted
by Ryan et al. (2000) failed to show the viewing effect because
it depends on awareness. However, changes in viewing behavior
absent awareness have been successfully documented in several
other experiments (Hayhoe et al., 1997; Hollingworth et al.,
2001, 2008; Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002; Henderson and
Hollingworth, 2003; Beck et al., 2007). As such, the result reported
by Ryan et al. (2000) can arguably be said to provide a second
strong demonstration of hippocampal involvement in implicit
expressions of memory.
Complementing these results, recent work indicates that eye-
movement-based memory effects may precede conscious aware-
ness (e.g., Hannula et al., 2007; see also Hannula et al., 2012),
and that activity in the hippocampus predicts these viewing
effects even when explicit recognition has failed (Hannula and
Ranganath, 2009). In these experiments (Hannula et al., 2007;
Hannula and Ranganath, 2009), participants studied scene-face
pairs and were tested with three-face displays superimposed on
studied scenes. All three faces in each test display were studied,
and on a subset of the trials, one of the faces had been paired
with the scene during the encoding phase. When a preview of
the scene was provided, disproportionate viewing of the associ-
ated face was evident approximately 500–750ms after three-face
display onset and preceded explicit recognition of that face by as
much as 1000ms 2. This preferential viewing effect was evident
within the same time frame regardless of the instructions pro-
vided at test, and even when it was counterproductive to view
the associate. When amnesic patients with hippocampal dam-
age were tested, viewing did not distinguish the associated face
from the other two faces in the display, which provides evi-
dence for relational memory impairment in these individuals.
A follow-up investigation conducted with neurologically intact
participants, which combined fMRI and eye tracking methods,
showed that hippocampal activity differences during presenta-
tion of the scene cue predicted the viewing effect, even when
analyses were limited to trials in which participants failed to
identify the associated face in their explicit recognition responses
(Hannula and Ranganath, 2009 see Figure 2). Activity differences
associated with recognition accuracy were localized to lateral pre-
frontal cortex, and these differences, greater for correct than for
incorrect responses, were correlated with those in the hippocam-
pus during presentation of the three-face test displays. Like the
findings reported by Ryan et al. (2000), such results implicate
the hippocampus in relational memory retrieval, even without
awareness. Consistent with the two-stage model of conscious
2Results of several experiments have shown that eye-movement-based mem-
ory effects precede explicit responses and that the time course of these effects
is similar across investigations (cf. Hannula et al., 2012). While this consis-
tency is remarkable, we cannot rule out the possibility that retrieved content
may be accessible to awareness closer in time to the viewing effects than the
findings suggest. To address this issue, we are currently conducting new exper-
iments that will permit us tomore precisely examine the temporal relationship
between patterns of viewing and explicit recognition.
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the basic paradigm and results from Hannula
et al. (2007) and Hannula and Ranganath (2009). (A) Examples of
scene-face pairs presented during the study trials, along with a single,
associated test display in which the face on the left was the match (i.e., was
the associate of the scene). Each test trial began with the presentation of a
scene cue meant to prompt retrieval of the associated face. (B) Eye
movements from a representative participant superimposed on the test
display shown above. Fixations are indicated by white circles and the size of
the circle was proportionate to the amount of viewing time directed to the
fixated region. Transitions from one fixation to the next are indicated by red
lines. (C) Proportion of total viewing time directed to correctly identified
matching faces vs. faces that were merely selected from displays that did not
contain a match broken down into 250ms time bins following the onset of
the three face test display. Neurologically intact control participants showed
disproportionate viewing of the matching face just 500–750ms after the
faces were presented; no evidence of relational memory was evident in the
eye movement behavior of amnesic patients. (D) Bilateral regions of the
hippocampus for which BOLD signal was greater for incorrect trials during
presentation of the scene cue when subsequent viewing of the match was
high vs. when subsequent viewing of the match was low in college-age
participants. Trial-averaged time courses extracted from the left and right
hippocampal regions, respectively, show differences in BOLD signal between
high and low viewing trials during presentation of the scene cue. This result
illustrates hippocampal recruitment, even when explicit memory has failed.
recollection, the results further suggest that successful explicit
retrieval may depend upon interaction of the hippocampus with
prefrontal regions.
EVIDENCE FOR HIPPOCAMPUS-SUPPORTED LEARNING WITHOUT
AWARENESS
Hippocampal contributions to implicit memory have also been
documented in investigations that give rise to learning that
unfolds gradually over the course of several experimental trials
or blocks. As was the case for the retrieval paradigms, evidence
demonstrating hippocampus-supported implicit learning has
been obtained in investigations using multiple research methods
(e.g., fMRI, neuropsychological investigation) and across a variety
of experimental tasks (i.e., contextual cueing, visual statistical
learning, sequence learning, transitive inference), each of these
are described in turn below.
Perhaps more than any other investigative approach, the
contextual cueing paradigm, developed by Chun and Jiang
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(1998), has generated considerable debate about the existence
of hippocampus-dependent implicit memory expression (e.g.,
Chun and Phelps, 1999; Manns and Squire, 2001; Greene et al.,
2007; Preston and Gabrieli, 2008; Westerberg et al., 2011).
Critically, this paradigm has also been subject to rigorous
empirical investigation that has provided important insights into
the nature of the memory representations that support perfor-
mance (e.g., Jiang and Wagner, 2004; Brady and Chun, 2007).
Although the proposal that learning in this task is truly implicit
(e.g., Chun and Jiang, 2003) has been challenged, even skeptics
have confirmed that contextual cueing is evident in the perfor-
mances of “unaware” participants (Smyth and Shanks, 2008).
Therefore, this extensive literature provides a strong context for
evaluating conflicting evidence for and against hippocampal con-
tributions to task performance absent concomitant awareness of
the contingencies that support learning.
Participants in contextual cueing experiments search for a tar-
get (a rotated T) among an array of distractors (rotated L’s)
and upon locating the target, make a button press response
specifying whether it was rotated left or right. Over the course
of several experimental blocks, a subset of the search arrays is
presented repeatedly so that the distractors provide a stable spa-
tial configuration predictive of target location; the remaining
arrays are novel (i.e., presented just once) and have no predic-
tive value (see Figure 3A). Results consistently show that the
latency to locate the target decreases over the course of the
experiment for both novel and repeated arrays (i.e., a general
effect of skill learning), and that there is additional response
time facilitation for repeated (vs. novel) arrays, which has been
dubbed the contextual cueing effect. Based on early speculation
that response time facilitation to repeated contexts depended
ostensibly on the binding of target location to the global dis-
tractor configuration in which it was repeatedly embedded,
it was proposed that contextual cueing should depend criti-
cally on structures in the MTL, particularly the hippocampus
(Chun and Phelps, 1999). This proposal was notable because the
seminal set of experiments documented the contextual cueing
effect despite at-chance explicit recognition of repeated displays
(Chun and Jiang, 1998).
In an effort to identify the neural substrates of contextual
cueing Chun and Phelps (1999) conducted a neuropsycholog-
ical experiment with MTL amnesic patients and a matched
comparison group. Despite normal skill learning (i.e., decreased
latency for novel and repeated arrays across experimental blocks),
amnesic patients failed to demonstrate any additional facilitation
for displays presented repeatedly over the course of the experi-
ment (see Figure 3B). At first blush, this result seems strikingly
similar to the one reported by Cohen and Squire (1980)—
amnesic patients show normal skill learning, but fail to benefit
from repeated presentation of the same displays. The critical dif-
ference is that participants in the comparison group were rarely
aware that some of the displays had been presented repeatedly.
And more importantly, whether they reported having noticed
these repetitions or not, they failed to distinguish repeated from
novel displays when an explicit recognition test was administered.
Based on these findings, it was concluded that “the hippocam-
pal system mediates contextual (relational) encoding in humans,
without having to evoke consciousmemory processes” (Chun and
Phelps, 1999; p. 846).
The results reported by Chun and Phelps (1999) were soon
replicated in healthy participants under the influence of mida-
zolam, a pharmacological agent that can induce a temporary
amnesia (Park et al., 2004; see also Chun, 2005). This effect was
particularly striking because the same (neurologically intact) par-
ticipants who demonstrated intact contextual cueing absent the
effects of midazolam were impaired when the drug was admin-
istered. One notable short-coming of both investigations was
lack of anatomical specificity. While hippocampal atrophy was
reported for three of four patients tested by Chun and Phelps
(1999), one of whom was subsequently characterized as having
damage limited to the hippocampus (Verfaellie et al., 2000), the
remaining two had additional damage that extended beyond the
hippocampus into adjacent MTL cortical structures. Results of
a subsequent investigation (Manns and Squire, 2001) suggested
that contextual cueing was only impaired for a subset of patients
with extensive MTL lesions; those with damage limited to the
hippocampus performed normally. This outcome challenges the
claim that implicit expressions of learning in the contextual cue-
ing task are mediated by the hippocampus. However, as indicated
by Manns and Squire (2001), residual hippocampal tissue in
patients with limited damage (i.e., ∼32% average tissue loss with
none greater than 50%)may have contributed to intact contextual
cueing in their investigation, and the patient identified as hav-
ing limited hippocampal damage in the original work reported by
Chun and Phelps (1999) failed to show a contextual cueing effect.
Either way, the results are not easily accommodated by the declar-
ative memory theory, as the evidence clearly points to a role for
MTL cortical structures in unconscious learning and memory.
With the above caveats in mind, it is notable that contex-
tual cueing performance seems to be supported by (at least) two
qualitatively distinct memory representations (Jiang andWagner,
2004). Originally, it was assumed that with repeated exposure
to the array, the global geometric configuration of the distrac-
tors was learned and that contextual cueing was supported by a
bound representation of this configuration to the target location
in memory (Chun and Jiang, 1998). While this does indeed seem
to be the case (Jiang and Wagner, 2004), evidence suggests that
spatial relationships between individual distractors and the tar-
get can also support contextual cueing. Specifically, it was found
that if a target appears repeatedly in the same location for two
separate arrays, each with a different global configuration, con-
textual cueing was robust even on a transfer test in which half
of the distractors from the first array were recombined with half
from the second array, a manipulation that changed the global
configuration of display elements (see Figure 3C). Hence, two
representations seem to support contextual cueing: (1) a fused
representation of the global array configuration that, by some
views (e.g., relational memory theory and Henke’s processing
model), could be supported by structures in the parahippocampal
region and (2) a representation of spatial relationships between
the target and individual distractors that can give rise to flexible
memory expression when novel, recombined displays are pre-
sented. One possibility then is that spared performance on the
contextual cueing task in hippocampal amnesia reflects preserved
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FIGURE 3 | The contextual cueing task. (A) Illustration of the basic
contextual cueing paradigm. Participants attempt to locate a target (i.e., a
rotated T) from among an array of distractors (i.e., rotated L’s) as quickly as
possible upon display presentation. A subset of the displays are repeated
several times over the course of the experiment. (B) Illustration of the results
from Chun and Phelps (1999). Both amnesic patients and controls show
improved skill learning (i.e., faster target identification) over the course of the
experiment, but patients show no evidence for contextual cueing.
(C) Illustration of conditions used in the modified version of the contextual
cueing task that was used to examine transfer effects, and was developed by
Jiang and Wagner (2004). Trained displays were seen during learning, and
were also used to create recombined displays. Color coding (shades of blue)
was not used in the experiment, but is meant to illustrate how the
recombined display was created. Half of the elements in the display were
from one trained display, the remainder were from the other. The lines
connecting the display elements are meant to illustrate the differences in
overall gestalt of the display configuration, and were not present during
testing. Notice that the shape of the global configuration is different for the
recombined display than for both trained displays. Novel displays controlled
for any facilitation in responding that might be due to the target location
alone. The standard skill learning effect is illustrated in the graph on the left.
Effects of transfer are illustrated in the graph on the right. The time required
to locate and respond to a target was not different for recombined and old
displays, and both of these display types elicited faster responses than novel
displays. Such results provide evidence for flexible transfer of learning from
trained displays to recombined displays. [Figure 3B reprinted by permission
from Macmillan Publishers Ltd; http://www.nature.com/; Figure 3C, graphs,
reprinted with kind permission from Springer Science+Business Media.].
representation of global configuration in the parahippocampal
region. To the extent that the two documented representations
co-exist, one (i.e., the fused associative representation) might
compensate for the other (i.e., the flexible relational represen-
tation) in cases of hippocampal damage. Whether and when in
the course of learning these representations emerge remains to be
determined, but the suggestion has been made that early learning
might reflect spatial relationships between targets and individ-
ual distractors, and that representations of global configuration
develop more slowly (Jiang and Wagner, 2004).
Much like the neuropsychological work, results from recent
fMRI investigations attempting to identify the neural substrates
of contextual cueing have been mixed (Greene et al., 2007;
Preston and Gabrieli, 2008; Westerberg et al., 2011). While one
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study reported implicit, facilitation-related activity differences
in left posterior hippocampus and left parahippocampal cortex
(Greene et al., 2007), others found that hippocampal activity
differences were correlated with explicit recognition of repeated
displays (Preston and Gabrieli, 2008; Westerberg et al., 2011).
Notably, those studies failing to show implicit hippocampal dif-
ferentiation included only trial number (or epoch) and stimulus
type (i.e., novel vs. repeated arrays) as parametric factors in
the reported fMRI analyses. Greene et al. (2007) likewise did
not find implicit hippocampal effects with just these two fac-
tors, but recognized that not all repeated arrays showed robust
response time facilitation. Including reaction time as a factor
in subsequent analyses had two consequences: (1) hippocam-
pal differentiation was revealed as an interaction of stimulus
type and reaction time in the left posterior hippocampus, such
that the effect was only evident for repeated arrays with greater
response time facilitation; and (2) the decrease in unexplained
variance allowed the detection of a main effect of stimulus type
located bilaterally in the posterior hippocampus. It is, therefore,
advised that future investigation of contextual cueing incorporate
this approach.
As stated above, some neuroimaging studies have revealed hip-
pocampal activity differences associated with explicit recognition
of repeated displays (Preston andGabrieli, 2008;Westerberg et al.,
2011). In one of these investigations 13 of 23 participants per-
formed above chance on the recognition test administered after
learning (Preston and Gabrieli, 2008); using the same methods,
Greene et al. (2007) reported at-chance recognition among their
participants. Such differences in behavioral outcome are diffi-
cult to explain, but may reflect slight modification of instruction,
and/or differences in strategy adopted by the participants to per-
form the task. Indeed, changes in strategy, based for example on
encouragement to guess, can improve recognition performance,
but these performance improvements do not always reflect con-
scious retrieval processes (Voss et al., 2008; Voss and Paller, 2009,
2010). The remaining study that reported hippocampal activity
differences linked to awareness used a procedure in which partici-
pants were instructed about repetitions and told to use this infor-
mation to their advantage while performing the task (Westerberg
et al., 2011). Clearly, further investigation is needed to better pin
down the variables that drive hippocampal recruitment in con-
textual cueing. Aside from incorporating the analysis technique
described above, future work might also examine whether and
how structures in the MTL, and especially the hippocampus, con-
tribute to successful (flexible) transfer (as reported by Jiang and
Wagner, 2004) when two displays associated with the same target
location are used to create a novel configuration. The expecta-
tion here would be that activity differences in the hippocampus
would support facilitated responding to recombined displays on
the transfer test.
Response time facilitation in the contextual cueing paradigm
derives from the presentation of displays in which target loca-
tion is predicted by the simultaneous presentation of an invariant
context. As such, there is no requirement to integrate display ele-
ments across time. An alternative approach that has been used to
investigate incidental learning involves manipulation of the tran-
sitional probabilities among individual items seen repeatedly over
the course of an experiment or an experimental block. A subset
of these items are presented in a repeated sequence so that one
item has the potential to reliably predict, or cue, the appearance
of another (e.g., Face A always precedes Scene A); the remaining
items are also repeated, but have no predictive value.
Recent work suggests that the hippocampus is engaged by
these statistical learning paradigms, and is sensitive to the
temporal co-occurrence of items embedded in repeated sequences
(Turk-Browne et al., 2008, 2010). In one of these investiga-
tions, the hippocampus was the only region that showed reliably
enhanced activity during the presentation of the first element
in a “paired” set, which suggests that it may be involved in
the process of anticipating, or calling to mind, the (temporally)
associated element as learning proceeds. This result resembles
findings described earlier, in which hippocampal activity differ-
ences during presentation of a scene cue predicted viewing of the
associated face (Hannula and Ranganath, 2009). In both cases,
presentation of a cue may elicit retrieval of relationally bound
memory representations, perhaps by way of pattern completion
processes mediated by the hippocampus (Hannula et al., 2007).
Importantly, results indicated that these effects reflect implicit
learning because participants were unaware of repeated patterns
when a post-test awareness questionnaire was administered; how-
ever, performance on a post-learning recognition test revealed
greater than chance discrimination of sequentially presented pairs
vs. foils. While a skeptic might argue that this result implicates
conscious processes in learning, recent work (mentioned briefly
above) has suggested that the relationship between recognition
performance and explicit memory might not be so straightfor-
ward. Specifically, it has been found that when participants are
encouraged to guess, implicit memory can support successful
forced-choice responding (cf. Voss and Paller, 2010). Clearly,
this is an important issue that will be a source of much future
investigation, and is something to consider with respect to the
interpretation of results from post-learning recognition tests as
these are often administered with instructions that encourage
participants to guess. Borrowing from Voss and Paller (2010),
researchers could incorporate confidence judgments that include
a “guess” response in future work as a first step toward addressing
the possibility that correct recognition on awareness tests reflects
accurate guessing.
As discussed earlier, representational flexibility is considered
a key property of hippocampus-dependent memory represen-
tations. This flexibility underscores demonstrations of explicit
memory, and is made possible because the complex relationships
mediated by the hippocampus are necessary for disambigua-
tion (pattern separation) and for the generativity of cued recall
(pattern completion; cf. Norman and O’Reilly, 2003). As sug-
gested above, certain implicit tasks may necessarily involve the
hippocampus if the associated task demands require pattern com-
pletion or pattern separation. One such task is the serial reaction
time task (SRTT), which is performed implicitly, depends upon
both pattern separation and pattern completion, and requires
contributions of the hippocampus and surroundingMTL cortical
structures to support performance.
In the SRTT, a series of stimuli appear on a screen and each
unique stimulus requires a distinct response (e.g., a particular
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button press) from the participant. Embedded in the series of
stimuli are certain repeating sequences, and when these sequences
are short, unambiguous, and occur with enough regularity, par-
ticipants show faster reaction time for items cued by the sequence
than for randomly occurring items (cf. Reed and Johnson, 1994).
Based on the nature of this facilitation, and on findings of perfor-
mances among amnesic patients that are comparable to those of
controls, it has been said that this is a clear example of procedural
learning. However, longer sequences may be used wherein the
predictive value of multiple items is Markovian. In the simplest
case, consider the sequence A-D-C-D-A-B-D-B. In this case, the
predictive value of D is ambiguous as it precedes A, B, and C
equally often. In order to make correct predictions for items fol-
lowing D, it is necessary to keep track of the item prior to D. That
is, A-D unambiguously predicts C, while C-D unambiguously
predicts A, and B-D unambiguously predicts B.
Critically, in this version of the SRTT performance is not asso-
ciated with awareness of the repeating sequence, amnesic patients
are impaired (Curran, 1997), and the impairment is amplified
as more items are required for the sequence to be predictive
(e.g., Shanks et al., 2006). While it may be difficult to draw
definitive conclusions about the involvement of the hippocampus
based on the data from amnesic patients, several lines of con-
verging evidence make the case stronger. First, normal-memory
participants under the influence of systemic diazepam, which
induces a temporary amnesia, showed impaired performance
on the SRTT comparable to that of organic amnesics (Shanks
et al., 2006). Second, fMRI reveals that normal memory partic-
ipants show significantly greater activation in the hippocampus
and surrounding MTL cortical structures while performing the
SRTTwhen there are higher-order sequences (like those described
above) embedded in the stimulus set (Schendan et al., 2003a,b).
Together, these results provide yet another compelling demon-
stration of hippocampus-mediated facilitation on a task that is
performed without awareness and requires flexible representation
of relationships among items.
One final well-studied implicit learning task that requires rela-
tional flexibility (i.e., pattern separation and pattern completion)
is the transitive inference (TI) task. The TI task is of particular
interest because it requires both induction and deduction, and
allows the inference of unstudied relationships. Thus it provides
insights into how we may use past learning to model complex
contingencies sufficient for prediction under novelty. Indeed,
any discussion of relational flexibility must be predicated on the
notion that the fundamental utility of memory is to improve our
ability to negotiate future events (cf. Schacter et al., 2008).
In a typical TI experiment, participants are trained to make
certain pairwise discriminations. For instance if A and B are pre-
sented simultaneously, participants would learn by trial and error
to choose A (hereafter abbreviated A>B). Such items are referred
to as premise pairs, and a series of overlapping premise pairs
is acquired by the participant over the course of several trials
(e.g., A>B, B>C, C>D, D> E, E>F). It is possible to maintain
the acquired information as five distinct pieces of information,
or alternatively, to integrate it into a more global representation
(i.e., A>B>C>D>E>F). Note that this global representation
requires fewer operations, but also contains information not
trained—namely, relationships between non-adjacent pairs. This
can be tested by asking participants to make decisions about non-
studied pairings such as B?D, B?E, and C?E. Correctly choosing
B>D, B>E, and C>E is evidence that participants have ordered
the items and have made correct inferences (note that pairings
with A or F require no inferences as these are always and never
correct, respectively).
Interestingly, participants can perform well above chance on
inferred items in the absence of explicit strategies (e.g., Greene
et al., 2001). That is, while participants are aware they have
learned the premise pairs, they do not deliberately infer novel
relations and are generally unaware that they have made an infer-
ence, or that it was possible to do so. In addition, performance on
the TI task has been shown to depend critically on the hippocam-
pus from converging evidence as fMRI data shows that success on
the TI task depends on activity differences in the hippocampus
during both study and test (Greene et al., 2006), and hippocam-
pal amnesics are not capable of doing the task (Smith and Squire,
2005).
There is some concern about how awareness is assessed in this
paradigm. Indeed, it has been asserted that successful inference
is related to task awareness (Smith and Squire, 2005). However,
Greene et al. (2001) have shown that a brief training period
leads to high inference without awareness, while extended train-
ing leads to nearly every participant becoming task-aware. A close
examination of the methods used by Smith and Squire (2005)
reveals that their conclusion that performance and awareness are
related is entirely attributable to overtraining (see Greene, 2007).
Others are concerned that implicit inference may be an example
of pseudo-inference (e.g., Frank et al., 2003). According to this
argument, the closer an item is to an endpoint of the sequence,
the stronger is its reinforcement value. The first item is never
wrong, and thus has the highest reinforcement value, the last
item is never right, and therefore has the lowest reinforcement
value; intermediate items obtain intermediate values according to
their proximity to the end items. Thus the B>D choice can be
made without true inference by simply comparing the relatively
higher positive weight of B to D. Even if this pseudo-inference
account is correct, all of the direct evidence implicates the hip-
pocampus as necessary for success in this task. More importantly,
a similar inference task has been devised which has no endpoints,
and therefore cannot be solved with a differential weighting strat-
egy (see Figure 4; Leo and Greene, 2008; adapted from Bunsey
and Eichenbaum, 1996). As with similar TI studies, participants
performed well above chance on all inferences and few exhib-
ited any sign of explicit strategy or knowledge; in fact, most were
surprised to learn in debriefing that the items at test had not
been studied.
EVIDENCE FOR HIPPOCAMPUS-SUPPORTED ENCODING WITHOUT
AWARENESS
As has been discussed, models of hippocampal function diverge
with respect to whether or not conscious apprehension of
stimulus input is considered necessary during encoding (e.g.,
Moscovitch, 1992; Henke, 2010). In line with those who claim that
consciousness is critical, the idea that information presented sub-
liminally can support subsequent memory expression seems to
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FIGURE 4 | Illustration of the modified transitive inference paradigm
that cannot be solved via pseudo-inference. In this version of the task,
three items (e.g., faces, objects) appear on the screen in an upside
down triangle on each trial. Participants are instructed to choose one of
the top two items via button-press, and are told that the bottom item
determines which of the remaining two items is correct. Two sets of these
trial types are developed for training. As illustrated in the figure, when “M”
is presented on the bottom (in training set 1) participants learn to choose
“A”, and when “X” is presented on the bottom (in training set 2) participants
learn to choose “M”. Once criterion learning has been achieved on all of
displays presented during learning, the test for transitivity is administered.
In this case, participants have not learned (i.e., were not trained on) the
relationships among display elements, but must make an inference.
Evidence for inference is obtained when, for example, participants choose
“A” when “X” is the discriminative stimulus. In this case “X” and “A” are
indirectly linked via “M”. As indicated in the text, this version of the TI task
has no endpoints and cannot be solved using pseudo-inference.
go against the grain of conventional findings that document the
beneficial influence of deep or elaborative encoding on memory
performance (Craik and Lockhart, 1972). More generally, in the
implicit perception literature, questions about the extent to which
subliminal information can be processed perceptually and espe-
cially conceptually (i.e., semantically) have incited much debate
(e.g., Holender, 1986; Dulany, 1997; Reingold, 2004); such dis-
agreement has led to the development of very strict criteria for
demonstrating that stimulus input was in fact completely masked
from awareness before claims of implicit processing can be made
(see Hannula et al., 2005 for review). Having been informed by
this debate, and the methodological constraints that have been
put in place as a result, Henke and colleagues (Henke et al.,
2003a,b; Degonda et al., 2005; Duss et al., 2011) have devel-
oped a program of fMRI research that seems to pose a significant
challenge to staunch adherents of the view that the hippocam-
pus cannot or does not contribute to encoding processes when
stimulus input is not consciously accessible.
In these experiments, subliminal encoding entails presenta-
tion of several face-occupation name pairs that are flashed briefly
and sandwiched in between a set of visual pattern masks that
render the pair invisible (see Figure 5A). An incidental memory
test that entails supraliminal (i.e., visible) presentation of the
faces, absent the associated occupation name, is then adminis-
tered following a delay (e.g., 5min)—that any effect of implicit
memory can be identified with a delay in place is itself worthy
of comment, as effects of implicit perception on performance
are thought to be relatively short-lived (Wolfe, 1999; see also
Simons et al., 2006). Nonetheless, evidence for implicit mem-
ory has now been successfully documented in several of these
experiments, using a wide variety of tasks and measures of per-
formance. For example, when instructed at test to guess the
occupational category (i.e., artist or academic) or occupation-
related characteristics (e.g., long or short education) of the
individual depicted by the face, response times were faster for
correct than for incorrect guesses (see Figure 5B; Henke et al.,
2003b; see also Duss et al., 2011). In addition, results show that
participants can classify these faces according to occupation-
related characteristics with above-chance accuracy (Duss et al.,
2011). Based on the processing requirements of these tasks, which
require flexible representation of relationships among items, one
might expect the hippocampus to be recruited during sub-
liminal encoding and/or incidental retrieval of face-occupation
name pairs. The results do not disappoint, as activity differ-
ences relative to respective control conditions have been observed
in the anterior hippocampus (and perirhinal cortex) not only
during the supraliminal retrieval phase 3, but also during sub-
liminal encoding (Henke et al., 2003a,b). Perhaps more com-
pelling, hippocampal (and perirhinal) engagement was correlated
with response time differences on the incidental test of memory
(see Figure 5C).
The basic paradigm described above was modified in subse-
quent investigation (Degonda et al., 2005) so that the subliminal
encoding phase was followed by visible encoding prior to testing.
Such manipulations provided more opportunity to investigate
influences of implicit exposure on subsequent behavior and brain
activity. In three separate experiments, the occupation name
paired with a given face during visible encoding was either from
the same category (e.g., artist: photographer → guitarist), the
other category (e.g., artist: poet→ academic: professor), or was
exactly the same occupation (i.e., painter→ painter) as that asso-
ciated with that face during subliminal encoding. Under these
circumstances, it was found that the ease with which participants
could imagine the individual in the associated occupation during
the second, visible encoding phase was significantly reduced in
the incongruent condition. Moreover, results from the test phase
3Note that while the stimuli were visible (i.e., supraliminal) during the
retrieval phase, the retrieval process was necessarily implicit because face-
occupation pairs had been encoded without awareness (i.e., subliminally).
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FIGURE 5 | Illustration of methods and results from Henke et al. (2003b).
(A) Illustration of the conditions used during encoding and the masking
procedure that renders the stimuli invisible. Two encoding conditions were
used in the experiment. In the experimental condition a face was presented
along with the name of a particular profession and in the control condition the
face was presented alone. During the supraliminal test phase (i.e., no
masking), participants made a button-press response indicating whether the
person depicted by the face was an academic or an artist. (B) Illustration
of subliminal learning effects evident during performance of the incidental
memory test. Participants responded more quickly when they correctly
guessed the occupational category associated with a face-profession
pair seen during subliminal encoding than when they got the categorization
response incorrect. No such facilitation was seen in the control condition,
which confirmed that this difference was not merely a consequence of
certain faces being better matched to one category over the other.
(C) Activity differences in the right hippocampus (and perirhinal
cortex) sensitive to subliminal encoding of face-occupation pairs (left),
and activity differences in the right hippocampus (and perirhinal
cortex) that were correlated with the response time differences shown in (B).
[Figure 5 reprinted with permission from Elsevier].
showed that correct identification of the occupational category
for a given face was reduced for all three conditions relative to
a control in which the face had been paired with a nonsense
word during subliminal encoding. As such, there were several
converging pieces of evidence for successful acquisition of sub-
liminally encoded content. Consistent with the findings reported
in earlier studies by the group, hippocampal activity was evi-
dent during subliminal encoding in all three experiments, and
greater hippocampal recruitment was positively correlated with
the reported deficit in explicit retrieval for both the incongruent
and congruent conditions. Such results are perhaps surprising,
but as they have been consistently replicated, it seems that mod-
els of hippocampal function will need to account for them.
Future work might also examine whether or not there are dif-
ferences in how information is conveyed to the hippocampus
when stimuli are presented subliminally. To our knowledge this
question has not yet been addressed, but similar issues have
been a source of on-going investigation in the emotion litera-
ture. The dominant view, which has not gone unopposed (cf.
Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010), attributes rapid implicit processing
of affective visual stimuli to a short latency subcortical pathway
that bypasses visual cortex and conveys information directly to
the amygdala by way of the superior colliculus and the pulv-
inar. This research, and the ensuing debate, will likely inform
similar questions about hippocampus-supported subliminal
memory.
AT THE TIPPING POINT: HIPPOCAMPAL FUNCTION
EXTENDS BEYOND CONSCIOUS MEMORY
As has been conveyed in the preceding section, there is now
considerable evidence from experiments conducted with a range
of methodological techniques that implicates the hippocampus
in memory without awareness. Such findings have been docu-
mented in investigations that examined implicit retrieval, implicit
learning, and implicit encoding. Perhaps most surprising is the
evidence for hippocampus-mediated implicit (and in the exam-
ples described above, subliminal) encoding. These experiments,
which borrow substantially from lessons learned in the implicit
perception literature about how best to eliminate awareness, have
been replicated several times, and are not easily accommodated
by models of hippocampal function that place a premium on
conscious apprehension of encoded content (e.g., Moscovitch,
1992). The results are, however, in line with the view that the
hippocampus is critically involved in binding together inter-item
or item-context relationships that can then give rise to flexible
memory expression (e.g., Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Henke,
2010). Indeed, even a cursory comparison of the experiments
reported above reveals quite readily that what these tasks have
in common is the requirement for relational memory binding
and representation. Additional information as to what exactly
this might entail is provided by Olsen and colleagues (this issue)
who propose that the specific role of the hippocampus may be
to continuously bind the elements of experience and to compare
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representations retained in memory to current perceptual input.
One result of this continuous binding and comparison process is
that novel information can be integrated into existing relational
memory representations. Consistent with the evidence reviewed
here, Olsen and colleagues contend that both of these processes
can proceed in the absence of awareness and that the result-
ing relational memory representation need not be consciously
accessible.
To date, the bulk of the evidence in support of hippocampus-
mediated implicit memory seems to have come from
investigations that involve temporally extended (i.e., multi-
ple trial) learning, which according to some views, should not
depend upon the hippocampus (Henke, 2010). Importantly,
Henke (2010) does indicate that there may be exceptions to this
rule. Semantic memories, for example, may depend initially on
the hippocampus despite repeated exposure, and concessions are
made for “rare” episodic memories that retain their flexibility
with the passage of time. As there are now several findings that
implicate the hippocampus in implicit learning that develops
gradually over the course of several experimental trials, further
specification of the model describing exactly when and how the
hippocampus would be involved in such learning seems war-
ranted. Altogether, the results are perhaps most problematic for
those who have retained a strict interpretation of the declarative
memory theory (e.g., Squire, 2004), in which the hippocampal
system is said to mediate only those memories that are amenable
to conscious report (i.e., can be “declared”). While the relational
memory theory shares the view that MTL structures (including
the hippocampus) support declarative memory (cf. Cohen and
Eichenbaum, 1993), proponents of this view do not take a hard
line on the consciousness issue (e.g., Cohen et al., 1997; Ryan and
Cohen, 2003). One possibility then is that declarative memory is
perhaps best characterized as a subset of relational memory, and
as an especially good example of relational memory when studies
are conducted with human subjects.
The extant possibility is that the hippocampus is necessary,
but not sufficient for conscious recollection. Indeed, it has been
proposed that other regions, namely structures in the prefrontal
cortex and parietal cortex (Cohen et al., 1997; Moscovitch, 2008),
interact with the hippocampus and in so-doing, contribute to
the process of conscious recollection. That this may indeed be
the case is suggested by converging evidence implicating the pre-
frontal cortex in facilitating top-down selection and organization
of retrieved content, as well as updating features relevant to the
demands of on-going retrieval attempts (see Shimamura, 2011 for
review). The literature proposing a role for the parietal cortex in
memory retrieval is relatively recent, but there is now a consid-
erable amount of evidence implicating posterior parietal cortex
(PPC) in particular aspects of memory retrieval. Interestingly,
activity differences in PPC show that this brain region is respon-
sive not only to correct memory decisions, but also to false
alarms, which suggests that it may play an especially impor-
tant role in subjective experience (e.g., Wheeler and Buckner,
2003). Several recent theoretical perspectives (see Shimamura,
2011 for review) have been advanced in an attempt to explain
the role of the PPC in memory. Across perspectives, this region
has been implicated in the process of accumulating/monitoring
retrieved content (Wagner et al., 2005), acting as an episodic
buffer (Vilberg and Rugg, 2008), and directing attention to
retrieved content (Cabeza et al., 2008; Ciaramelli et al., 2008).
Among these perspectives, the “attention to memory model”
(Cabeza et al., 2008; Ciaramelli et al., 2008) has perhaps pro-
vided the most detailed account of how the PPC might interact
with MTL and PFC regions during retrieval. Specifically, it is pro-
posed that dorsal PPC might interact with (dorsolateral) PFC
to mediate top-down, effortful, retrieval processes and that ven-
tral PPC might interact with MTL structures in a bottom-up
fashion. In this case, attention is captured by content that has
been retrieved by MTL structures, including the hippocampus.
More precise specification of how exactly these structures might
interact requires further investigation, as does differentiating
among competing views (see also Shimamura, 2011 for another
proposal), but these efforts do provide a starting point for iden-
tifying when and how other brain regions might contribute to
memory retrieval and the associated experience of conscious
recollection.
Finally, it is worth considering which empirical approaches are
most likely to yield success in endeavors to further explore the
role of the hippocampus in unconscious encoding and/or sub-
sequent expression of memory. In some cases, it is preferable
to design a task that precludes knowledge of the link between
task performance and memory. Devising such tasks can be par-
ticularly difficult because the complexity of the task demands
often favor explicit strategies and because any overtraining can
impel awareness of the contingencies that support performance
(cf. Greene, 2007). Tasks already known to require hippocampal
involvement can sometimes be designed to minimize the likeli-
hood of awareness, but in designing such tasks, several factors
should be considered. Such factors include, but are not limited
to: (1) maintaining the shortest possible task exposure, espe-
cially avoiding time for rumination; (2) use of brief stimulus
exposure; (3) use of novel stimulus materials; (4) use of more
stimulus items than can be deliberately memorized; (5) design-
ing tasks that cannot be supported by verbal strategies; and in
this case, (6) avoiding any hint whatsoever that the task involves
learning or memory. On the other hand, it is critical to consider
that one can lessen task awareness without entirely eliminating
its use; as such, one runs the risk that explicit strategies might
be used but not detected. The approach adopted by Henke and
colleagues (e.g., Duss et al., 2011), which makes use of masking
procedures to render stimulus input invisible, offers promise in
this regard. As an alternative to the above approach, one might
opt to combine direct tests (e.g., forced-choice recognition tests)
with additional measures that are capable of revealing effects of
memory in the absence of awareness. Approaches that have a
documented track record along these lines include, but are not
limited to, concomitant acquisition of sensitive indirect measures
(e.g., eye movements) with behavioral testing (see Hannula et al.,
2010 for review) and incorporation of methods that facilitate, and
have the potential to reveal, accurate guessing (cf. Voss and Paller,
2010). Use of these methods acknowledges that memory tests are
rarely process pure, and may permit investigators to more effec-
tively tease apart the contributions made by explicit and implicit
memory to performance.
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In sum, the existence of implicit, hippocampus-dependent
tasks has eluded scientists for decades because such tasks are dif-
ficult to design and can readily trigger awareness—consequently,
we are near the beginning of this endeavor. However, as reviewed
here, we now have a solid starting point as several lines of
converging evidence have implicated the hippocampus in uncon-
scious memory. Unraveling the Gordian knot of hippocampal
function will undoubtedly require a great deal more empirical
instances than are presently available in the literature, making this
line of work ripe for further investigation.
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